



A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY 





I. Preliminary remarks 
 
When Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) (hereinafter Res 1373) was adopted it 
attracted a great deal of attention because of its revolutionary character. For the first 
time, the Security Council (SC), pressed by the need to answer terrible terrorist attacks, 
adopted a clear legislative role by establishing general obligations disconnected from 
any particular conflict for all States. The emotional environment created by the 9/11 
events helps to explain this innovative move that aroused the criticism of those who 
conceived the SC as a mere executive branch. The singular organic structure established 
to supervise the implementation of the Resolution also offers an interesting testing 
ground to analyse future trends of global governance to safeguard common universal 
interests. 
This chapter studies the content of Res 1373, its organic and procedural structure, and 
later explores the path travelled during more than a decade of implementation with its 
main achievements and shortcomings. The contribution concludes with some reflections 
on the future of counter-terrorist cooperation in the United Nations (UN) and a proposal 
to create a UN Counter-Terrorist Agency. 
Let me clarify that I will not focus on the issues raised by SC Res 1624 (2005) as there 
is another chapter of this book more specifically dealing with these questions. 
 
II. SC Resolution 1373 and its legislative nature 
 
2.1. The content of SC Resolution 1373 
 
Res 1373 divides the obligations that it imposes on States into three sections. The first 
section of its regulatory part contains a series of compulsory measures against terrorism 
financing. The second section, also mandatory, spells out different types of measures to 
fight against terrorism. A third section contains another set of general counter-terrorist 
measures, but states are just ‘called upon’ to adopt them. The Resolution also created a 
Counter-Terrorist Committee (CTC) to supervise its implementation. In practice, 
however, the fact that the CTC has simultaneously encouraged the implementation of all 
these measures in a cooperative way, and their varied degree of application depending 
on the economic or political circumstances existing in each country, have resulted in a 
blurring of the different legal nature of the obligations set out in the above-mentioned 
three sections. Besides, Res 1373 established reporting obligations on states and 
expressed the SC’s ‘determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full 
implementation of this resolution’. 
Some of the mandates contained in Res 1373 merely express states’ obligations of 
general international law previously recognized as such by the GA: a) the obligation to 
refrain from organizing, facilitating or financing terrorist acts, or to ensure that their 
territories are not used for the preparation of these acts
2
, b) the provision of information 
to other States to prevent terrorist acts
3
, c) the denial of safe haven, asylum or refugee 
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, and d) the prosecution or extradition of terrorist found on their 
territory (aut dedere aut judicare)
5
. Other obligations are described in a programmatic 
sense, as an incentive to capacity building and cooperation (i.e. the provision to other 
States of ‘the greatest measure of assistance’ in criminal investigations or proceedings, 
or the improvement of border controls, including the adoption of measures against the 
counterfeiting of identity documents)
6
 or are included in section 3 of the Resolution, as 
appeals made by the SC (the call to ratify international conventions against terrorism)
7
. 
Therefore, the provisions against terrorism financing, mainly set out in the first section 
of Res 1373, are its most innovative part both in their nature (legislative and not only 
declarative) and in content. Certainly, the stipulation in letter a) to ‘prevent and suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts’ can be considered as having being included in the general 
statement previously made by the GA that under international law states had to ensure 
that their territories are not used for the organization of terrorist acts
8
. However, the 
obligation to ‘criminalize’ the provision or collection of funds with the intention to 
finance terrorist attacks (Res 1373, section 1.b) was a legal novelty in general 
international law, above all if it is read in conjunction with section 2.e) which requires 
States to qualify ‘as serious criminal offences in domestic laws’ not only the 
perpetration of terrorist acts but also their financing and planning
9
. The SC was thus 
extending to all States a contractual obligation enshrined in Article 4 of the 1999 UN 
Convention against terrorism financing. 
The obligation established in section 1.c) of Res 1373 is even more surprising because 
of its wide scope that clearly exceeds what is required by the 1999 Convention. The SC 
imposes upon States the duty to freeze the funds not only of any person who participates 
in terrorist acts, but also of entities under his direct or indirect control, and even of 
‘associated persons and entities’. Article 8 of the 1999 Convention just envisages the 
freezing or seizure of funds ‘used or allocated for the purpose’ of committing terrorist 
crimes. As regards legal persons, Article 5 of the same Convention only requires their 
liability to be established ‘when a person responsible for the management or control of 
that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed’ an act of terrorism financing. The 
comparison with the 1999 Convention shows the comprehensive and stringent drafting 
of Res 1373, even if States seem to enjoy a certain margin of manoeuvre. 
Section 1.d) of Res 1373 requires that States prohibit any person or entity in their 
territory to provide any funds or financial (or other related) services to any person or 
entity related to terrorism. Remarkably, this specification of section 1.a) does not appear 
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in the 1999 Convention, which only deals with the intended crime of terrorism 
financing. The only obligations that the latter establishes for legal persons not directly 
involved in terrorism financing consist of identifying their customers and reporting 
transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity (see its Article 18.1.b). 
Thus, Res 1373 shows itself again more rigorous than the 1999 Convention and fills a 
vacuum left in the conventional norm. 
The analysis above demonstrates that Res 1373 does not simply reproduce norms of 
general international law or rules previously established by the GA. Nor is it correct to 
assert that Res 1373 just extends to all States some of the obligations enshrined in the 
1999 Convention because, as we have seen, it sometimes goes beyond the conventional 
text or fills lacunae not envisaged in it. Therefore, with this Resolution the SC creates 
new general obligations for States, not connected to a particular conflict, and imposes 
on them the duty to adopt a series of legislative and executive measures in their internal 
legal order. In so doing, the SC enacted a living norm of transnational criminal law and 
created an organ (the CTC) to supervise and influence the drafting of national 




2.2. Chapter VII of the Charter as the legal basis of the Security Council’s 
legislative powers 
 
The SC adopted Res 1373 acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. More 
specifically, it seems clear that the SC relied on Article 41 of the Charter when it 
decided that all States had to adopt certain measures against terrorism that did not 
involve the use of force
11
. The use of Chapter VII of the Charter to back up a legislative 
competence of the SC has been questioned by a good number of commentators that 
mainly argue that this organ only enjoys executive competences and/or that it can only 
act to confront specific cases that threaten international peace and security
12
. Other 
authors, however, point out that there is no provision in the Charter limiting the SC’s 
discretion when it decides on the measures to be taken to counteract a threat to peace 
except respect for the purposes and principles of the UN
13
. Moreover, they defend a 
teleological interpretation of the Charter that would allow the attribution of legislative 
competences to the SC when that is needed to face global challenges to international 
security such as terrorism
14
. 
                                                 
10
 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 9/11’ (2011) 
Public Law 353, at 360-362; Marco Alberto Velásquez-Ruiz, ‘In the name of International Peace and 
Security: Reflections on the UN Security Council’s Legislative Action’ (2011) 18 International Law, 
Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 13, at 21-24  Pierre Klein, ‘Le Conseil de s curit  et la 
lutte contre le terrorisme : dans l exercice de pouvoirs toujours plus grands ’ (2007) 19 Revue qu b coise 
de droit international 133, at 138; José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 196-198. 
11
 Colombia’s representative, a member of the SC when Res 1373 was adopted, expressly cited Article 41 
of the Charter as the legal basis of the said Resolution (S/PV.4394 (Resumption 1), 25 Oct. 2001, 7). 
12
 Cathleen Powell, ‘A Fullerian Analysis of Security Council Legislation’ (2011) 8 IOLR 205 ; 
Velasquez-Ruiz (supra n. 10) at 33-37  Evelyne Lagrange, ‘Le Conseil de s curit  des Nations Unies 
peut-il violer le droit international  ’ (2004) 37 RBDI 577; Matthew Happold, ‘Security Council 
Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 600. 
13
 Article 24.2 UN Charter.  
14
 Guy Mebiama, ‘Le pouvoir normative du Conseil de S curit  de l’ONU : entre n cessit  et l gitimit ’ 
(2010) 85 Revue internationale de droit africain EDJA 29; Bryan C. Banks, ‘The Security Council as 
Global Legislator: Using Chapter VII Authority to redefine the United Nations Role in Developing 
International Legal Norms’ in Abdul Ghafur Hamid Khin Maung Sein (ed), The Theory and Practice of 




The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) suggested in its 
case-law that the SC enjoyed a legislative capacity, when justifying the legality of its 
creation through a SC Resolution based on Chapter VII of the Charter
15
. Moreover, the 
fact that Res 1373 was adopted unanimously and that it has been consistently backed by 
the Resolutions of the GA
16
 could be interpreted as a proof of the general acceptance of 
this normative capacity by the UN Members, at least in some exceptional 
circumstances. Furthermore, the ICJ has recognised that in the absence of any specific 
procedure to clarify the validity of the acts of the UN organs, each of them must 
determine its own jurisdiction
17
. 
Taking into account all these arguments, there are solid reasons to submit that the SC 
enjoys a legislative capacity to confront specific and imminent threats to international 
peace and security, although this power is subject to considerable legal, political and 
practical limits
18
. From a legal point of view, the SC must restrict itself to deal with 
threats to international peace and security, and has to respect the UN Charter and 
general international law
19
. In the political sphere, the SC’s lack of representation 
because of its limited membership confines this organ to enact rules that raise 
overwhelming international consensus. In a practical perspective, when the SC 
establishes complex or costly obligations they cannot be interpreted as obligations to 
achieve a result (that would not be realistic at a universal level) but as States’ 
obligations to cooperate in order to improve their capacities to attain a greater degree of 
compliance (e.g. effective border controls or formalization of the financial system). 
 
III. The implementation of SC Resolution 1373 
 
3.1. Institutional Architecture 
 
The CTC created by Res 1373 consists of special representatives of the fifteen members 
of the SC and is in charge of monitoring the implementation of that Res. This includes 
the evaluation of the implementation reports presented by the Member States, the 
boosting of the ratification of the relevant international counter-terrorism conventions, 
and the provision of technical assistance to those countries that need it. The small staff 
with which the CTC was provided (10 independent experts) soon proved to be clearly 
insufficient to cope with the gigantic task it had been assigned
20
. 
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In 2004 the CTC mandate was reinforced
21
 and SC Res 1535 (2004) set up a CTC 
Executive Directorate (CTED) to assist the work of the CTC and coordinate the 
monitoring of the implementation of Res 1373. With a staff of around 40 members 
(mainly legal experts), the CTED has made a substantial contribution to the work of the 
CTC and its mandate has been successively extended. The CTED is structured in two 
sections: an Assessment and Technical Assistance Office (ATAO)
22
, which is further 
divided into three geographical groups, and an Administrative and Information Office 
(AIO). It also counts on a senior human rights officer. The CTED has visited more than 
60 Member States to gather information on the real implementation of Res 1373 and on 
technical assistance needs. This has allowed the CTC to keep a prominent role as an 
exchange of information hub and as the main international coordination centre in the 
fight against terrorism. 
The CTC coordinates its work trying to develop synergies with the other SC 
Committees which deal with terrorist affairs, namely the Al Qaeda Committee (1267 
Committee), and the Committee against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their use by non-State actors (1540 Committee)
23
. It also 
cooperates with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, and more specifically its Terrorism 
Prevention Branch. Just before the GA’s adoption of the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy in 2006
24
 and in view of the proliferation of entities involved in the fight 
against terrorism within the UN system, the UN Secretary General created a Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)
25
 to coordinate the UN’s counter-
terrorism efforts. The CTED is one of the 31 entities participating in the Task Force, 
and this has helped to incorporate some input from other UN bodies and other 
international organizations in the activities of the CTED/CTC
26
. 
The creation of the CTC/CTED constituted in itself an important legal event. In its Res 
1373, the SC was not only legislating (establishing general permanent obligations upon 
States) but it was also setting up an extra-conventional organ to supervise the States’ 
implementation of these provisions, without ruling out taking ‘all necessary steps’ to 
ensure it. However, this revolution has been downplayed by the fact that in practice the 
CTC/CTED have acted as a channel of communication between the SC and States, 
focussing on the provision of technical assistance and capacity building on a 
cooperative basis, thereby obtaining a positive welcome from the generality of States, at 
least from a formal point of view. 
If the creation of the CTITF has eroded the leading role of the CTC in the coordination 
of international counterterrorist efforts, the recent birth of the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum (GCTF) in 2011, as an informal antiterrorist entity managed by the main donor 
countries by funds and expertise, may accentuate the overlapping of activities and the 
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need for a redefinition of the CTC’s role. While the express will of the CGTF’s 
founders is to reinforce UN counterterrorist efforts
27
, nevertheless this Forum gives the 
donor countries a tool to organize their technical assistance with more freedom and 
without the political and administrative strings inherent in the UN system. 
 
3.2. The follow-up 
 
When Res 1373 originally created the CTC, it established its main mission as the 
evaluation of the national reports that States were asked to present. The creation of the 
CTED significantly increased the CTC’s capacity to evaluate the States’ 
implementation of the Resolution due to its specialized technical departments and its 
country visits. 
The delivery of a first national report
28
 was always followed by a (confidential) 
response from the CTC that usually asked for clarifications or additional data. When the 
CTC felt that the State did not correctly interpret or apply Res 1373 it suggested 
legislative reforms. After the legislative phase, the CTC examined the human and 
technical resources of States to put these norms in practice, and coordinated the 
provision of technical assistance if needed. In addition, the CTC also encouraged 
international cooperation and focused on the specific problems of each State,
29
 even in 
areas not covered by Res 1373. All these issues were reviewed in subsequent reports. 
This exchange led to a constructive dialogue between the CTC and the State in most 
cases. 
Nevertheless, the answers of the CTC were progressively more detailed and stringent, 
as the weaknesses of the national counter-terrorist architecture were better identified
30
. 
There was a point at which some States became progressively uncomfortable with the 
revelation of their differences with the CTC or their defects and it was decided to 
discontinue the publication of country reports from 2007 to preserve the collaborative 
spirit in sensitive issues
31
. This decision was taken in the context of the revision of the 
CTC’s working methods, and the organization of the implementation evaluations on the 
basis of Preliminary Implementation Assessments (PIAs)
32
. A PIA offers the complete 
county profile in the implementation of Res 1373 and is periodically updated. After 
having completed in 2012 the initial assessments of all 193 UN Members, the 
CTED/CTC initiated a second round of evaluations, now called Overview of 
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, with a simplified format to minimize the report 
fatigue that some States complain about
34
. Each State is free to decide whether its OIA 
may be shared (in full or in part) with other Member States. In any case, a list on the 
CTC’s website informs of the date in which each State received the documents and the 
date on which it responded in order to stimulate the States’ diligence, as some of them 
have clearly relaxed after the first cooperation efforts. 
Country visits have also become an essential part of the CTED’s activities, as they 
allow its experts to check the accuracy of the data at their disposal, make a more fruitful 
exchange of information and ideas with Members possible, and give a first-hand 
experience of counter-terrorist practice in utterly different contexts
35
. Moreover, both 
formal assessments missions and ad hoc visits put additional pressure on States to 
implement Res 1373. 
 
3.3. Thematic areas 
 
The assessment on the implementation of Res 1373 is better understood if we 
distinguish the main topics it covers. 
 
A) The establishment of a legislative framework 
 
Many of the obligations imposed by Res 1373 directly address the need to enact a 
legislative framework that adequately prosecutes terrorist activities, criminalizing their 
financing, preparation or perpetration, and ensuring that those involved in these acts are 
brought to justice and their funds are frozen
36
. This was a priority in the early work of 
the CTC and most States have substantially improved their legal repertoire against 
terrorism thanks to this effort, although in some regions a great part of this work is still 
pending. In spite of the time already lapsed since the adoption of Res 1373, the CTC’s 
work has shown that a great number of obstacles hidden in the criminal justice systems 
continue to hinder the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related activities: the 
admissibility of classified information as evidence, the adequate protection of witnesses, 
the slowness and complexity on international judicial cooperation, etc. Even when a 
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coherent legislative framework is in force, political, legal or security concerns may 
obstruct the necessary international cooperation
37
. 
But the weakest point of this strategy lies in the ineffective implementation of these 
laws or in the lack of information about the resources effectively assigned to that end. 
The data gathered by the CTED and the country visits often show in many States the 





B) The fight against terrorism financing 
 
The prevention and repression of terrorism financing is one of the central elements of 
Res 1373. As explained before, the Resolution incorporates a demanding wording that 
requires the preventative freezing of funds, even of legal origin and when the terrorist 
acts have not yet taken place, if they are intended to finance such acts. It also prohibits 
the provision of financial services to persons or entities associated to or directly or 
indirectly controlled by terrorists. However, the constant evolution of financial markets 
and services greatly complicates this task: the proliferation of new payment systems and 
techniques
39
, the misuse of non-governmental organizations, the use of cash couriers, 
the alternative remittance systems, etc. Moreover, the alliances between terrorism 
financing and other forms of criminality further facilitate the concealment of terrorist 
funds within the magma of money laundering techniques. 
Aware of the enormousness and technical difficulties of the challenge, the CTED has 
cooperated closely with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the leading 
international standard setting body on these issues, and has been involved in the 




Nevertheless, in spite of the huge effort made, the CTED recognized in its latest Global 
Implementation Survey that: a) ‘a vast majority of States’ do not yet implement the 
freezing of funds as a preventative measure, and rely on criminal procedures to ‘seize’ 
funds, b) customer due diligence and anti-money laundering laws are not effective in 
countries with a high degree of informal economy and where large cash payments are 
usual, c) there is a lack of technical skill and modern material resources in many 
countries to control the new payment methods (such as mobile money transfers, pre-
paid cards or bearer negotiable instruments), d) lack of political will or poor capacities 
maintain charitable organizations as a safe cover for terrorist financing worldwide. As a 
conclusion, the CTED affirmed that ‘most States lack sufficient expertise and 
experience in the investigation and prosecution’ of terrorist financing
41
. This assertion is 
not surprising given the recurring failures of States to fight money laundering, an 
activity that shares many techniques with terrorism funding. 
 
C) The maintenance of effective border controls 
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The enforcement of effective border controls is another essential component of Res 
1373, as it aims above all to impede terrorist mobility, although it also makes reference 
to the need to avoid illicit arms-trafficking or terrorists’ access to weapons of mass 
destruction
42
. The problem that the CTC/CTED face to confront this challenge is that it 
clearly exceeds the counter-terrorist effort, and is related to the control of illegal 
immigration, to general international criminal cooperation, security in civil aviation and 
maritime navigation, customs controls, and even military or guerrilla activities. Thus, 
the CTED has relied on the work of other more specialized international institutions, 




In any case, the main threat to all this machinery against the improved screening of 
travellers and their baggage, the counterfeiting of travel documents or the detection of 
smuggling are the thousands of kilometres of frontiers without control that escape to 
States’ authority. A second factor to take into account when considering the limited 
success of these efforts is the cost of the human and material resources needed for the 
(always imperfect) sealing of borders, which is not affordable for many countries. 
Therefore, the CTC/CTED’s role in this matter merely consists of a modest contribution 
to the coordination of international initiatives to strengthen States’ capacity building. 
 
D) The protection of human rights 
 
At the beginning, the CTC did not consider that the protection of human rights was part 
of its mandate and for some years resisted the inclusion of human rights experts in its 
staff. However, the growing pressure from other UN agencies and some member States 
gradually changed this approach and embedded a reference to the need of respecting 
human rights and humanitarian law in the follow-up Resolutions to Res 1373
44
 and in 
the work of CTC/CTED. After its creation, the CTED included human rights experts in 
its staff and developed a regular relationship with the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on the 
promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, and other UN 
human rights bodies
45
. In May 2006 the CTC adopted policy guidance for CTED in the 
area of human rights
46
 and since 2008 one of the CTED’s working groups has been 
dedicated to human rights issues
47
. These developments have significantly improved the 
attention to fundamental rights in the evaluation procedures of the CTC/CTED. 
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At present, the CTED identifies three main areas of concern
48
: a) the abusive application 
of state of emergency laws to presumed terrorists with the consequent denial of 
fundamental rights, b) the enactment of special laws for the investigation and 
prosecution of terrorism that allow for long preventative or military detentions
49
, 
inaccessibility to secret information for the detainee’s lawyers, or grave infringements 
of the right to privacy, and c) overtly broad definitions of terrorism or of incitement to 
terrorism in national legislation as an excuse to restrict freedom of expression, 
conscience and assembly, or to repress political opposition
50
. 
In spite of the effort made, the feeling remains that the CTC/CTED consider that 
reinforcing the efficacy of anti-terrorist measures is their priority. Respect for human 
rights is described as a wanted complement of counter-terrorist policies rather than as an 
essential instrument for the ethical defeat of terrorism, and the bulk of the work needed 





3.4 Technical Assistance 
 
The provision and coordination of technical assistance to reinforce the counter-terrorist 
capabilities of States has become the main task of the CTC/CTED
52
. They identify the 
needs of each country and promote the sharing of information, the dissemination of 
good practices
53
 and the coordination of donor States. The CTED is also a key actor in 
the harmonization of efforts and standards of other international organizations and 
bodies with specialized expertise that can provide useful knowledge and experience in 
counter-terrorism, and organizes and attends a great number of seminars and workshops 
around the world fostering States’ capacity building in the relevant areas
54
. 
The CTED has adopted a thematic and regional approach to this technical assistance 
effort to better address the different needs of the recipient countries and to maximise 
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efficiency in the allocation of resources. As a Security Council body it tries to take the 
leading role in the provision of technical assistance in those issues more directly linked 
to the activity of the SC itself, while it delegates or supports the activities of other 
specialized institutions or donor countries when they enjoy a comparative advantage. 
There is a working group in the CTED specifically dedicated to the coordination of 
technical assistance that has created a database to better synchronize available expertise 
and identified needs of potential recipient countries. The great majority of the assistance 
requests are satisfactorily solved. 
The CTC/CTED are obliged to coordinate their technical assistance (and even its overall 
activity) with other committees of the Security Council that also deal with counter-
terrorist affairs, mainly the Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee
55
 and the Committee 
established by Res 1540 (2004)
56
. The CTED must also coordinate its activity with 
other UN organs, especially with the CTITF, which was created with the specific 
mandate to coordinate and give coherence to the counter-terrorism efforts in the UN 
system
57
 and whose primary goal consists of the provision of policy support and 
technical assistance to the Member States for the implementation of the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorist Strategy. In practice, the technical assistance provided by the UN 
Counter-Terrorism Center, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UNODOC and the 
CTED are materially indistinguishable
58
. 
Thus, the overlapping of activities seems to be unavoidable with the present organic 
structure of coincidental competencies and has been recognized by the SC itself
59
 and 
criticized by some Member States
60
. The Secretary-General has proposed the creation of 
a UN counter-terrorism coordinator to address this problem
61
 and the SC has formally 
welcomed the initiative
62
. S/he would chair the CTITF, but it is not clear what kind of 
authority s/he could have over a SC organ such as the CTC
63
. While it is true that the 
SC was the only institution that could put into operation an international counter-
terrorist cooperation network at the beginning of this century quickly and stringently, 
the progressive assumption of counter-terrorist responsibility by other UN organs (in 
particular with regard to technical assistance) has questioned the SC’s role that needs to 
be redefined. 
Another element leading to technical assistance’s diversification (and overlapping) 
derives from the bilateral or multilateral initiatives of donor countries outside the UN 
system. If some recipient States have complained in the past about the capacity of donor 
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countries to orient politically the technical assistance coordinated by the UN organs
64
, it 





IV. Sanctions for failures to comply? 
 
Until now the implementation of Res 1373 has been based on a promotional strategy, 
far from the threat of sanctions. The CTC/CTED have worked together with the 
Member States improving their counter-terrorist capacities, so that they could 
progressively fulfil the obligations imposed by the Resolution in a way adapted to their 
legal system and their political and economic circumstances. This constructive 
methodology has had a general positive effect on the States’ attitude as they have 
cooperated with unprecedented energy with the CTC/CTED’s information demands. 
However, two challenges threaten this relatively successful system: the reporting fatigue 
caused by many years of concurrent information obligations towards the UN counter-
terrorist organs
66
, and the CTC/CTED’s change of emphasis from gathering information 
and fostering the enactment of a legislative framework to the vigilance of the 
Resolution’s effective implementation
67
 (a more delicate and difficult task). In such 
circumstances, some States do not meet the regular reporting requirements of the CTC 
and the CTED has had to draw up an internal list of late or non-reporting member 
States. 
In Res 1373 the SC asserted ‘its determination to take all necessary steps in order to 
ensure [its] full implementation’
68
. This is the expression normally used by the SC to 
refer to coercive measures when acting on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Therefore, in theory, this is an available option (a potential threat), and one of the main 
reasons to keep the CTC’s tasks within the ambit of the SC is the weight that this 
relationship may give it to mobilize States will. Although country visits by the CTED or 
by other expert international organizations are always organized with the consent of the 
visited country and publicly placed in the context of technical cooperation, they put 
additional pressure on States as they are singled out in the SC agenda. Nevertheless, 
besides the traditional reluctance of this institution to adopt coercive measures, the 
constructive attitude of the CTC/CTED has until now prevented the adoption of 
sanctions against failures to comply with Res 1373 (both for material breaches or non-
fulfilment of reporting requirements) and many indications show that the imposition of 
these measures is very unlikely in the near future
69
. 
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One of the main problems that the adoption of sanctions would pose would be the 
determination of the threshold of breach that would entail the application of coercive 
measures. The information gathered by the CTED shows that the full implementation of 
Res 1373 will take much time. Global harmonization of laws against money laundering 
or on preventing abuse of the non-profit sector for the purposes of terrorist financing, or 
the general sealing of frontiers, to mention just a few examples, are objectives almost 
unattainable even in the medium term. Res 1373 is thus conceived in a programmatic 
perspective and all States are supposed to follow an ongoing process towards adequate 
implementation of the Resolution. 
Under such circumstances, the evaluation of the measures adopted in each State cannot 
be made without assuming a great degree of flexibility, always applying standards 
adapted to the geographical, economic and political situation. The publication of a 
directory of international best practices for the implementation of Res 1373
70
, or the 
simplification and standardization of OIAs
71
, represent a considerable effort by the 
CTC/CTED to objectify their assessment criteria. Nevertheless, in spite of all these 
initiatives, it has to be acknowledged that the CTC/CTED (and consequently the SC) 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion. All States have weak points and room to improve. 
Yet, the adoption of sanctions would create a delicate environment in which any 
practice suspicious of discrimination would provoke the discredit of the SC’s counter-
terrorist policies and would severely undermine the legitimacy of the CTC/CTED, 
which until now have enjoyed a wide international consensus. Thus, in the short term, 
the adoption of coercive measures for failures to comply with Res 1373 seems neither 
possible nor convenient
72
, unless a State openly refuses to cooperate with the CTC and 
develops a deliberate strategy in support of international terrorism that goes well 
beyond breaching the Resolution’s obligations. 
In any case, no State can claim the right to unilaterally determine the non-fulfilment of 
Res 1373, or even more to avail itself of the legitimacy to impose its implementation 
coercively. In the institutional system established by Res 1373, the verification and 
declaration of disobedience is the responsibility of the CTC (the organ created for such 
action by the SC) or of the SC itself, and only the latter may determine the 
consequences in that case. It cannot be ruled out that a State uses arguments similar to 
those that accompanied Iraq’s occupation in 2003 to justify the unilateral use of force 
against a State that does not cooperate in the fight against terrorism, even in the absence 
of SC authorization
73
. However, the nature of the measures envisaged in Res 1373, 
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which seek the improvement of the legal infrastructure and the material means against 
terrorism in the medium and long term, moves away from the theoretical foundations of 
pre-emptive self-defence
74
. It is only possible to imagine a legitimate armed reaction in 
circumstances where a State develops a direct cooperation with terrorist groups that are 
performing terrorist acts in other States, as happened in the 9/11 attacks
75
. 
The adoption of unilateral countermeasures (that do not imply the use of force) against a 
State infringing Res 1373 could find some leeway in the ILC Articles on Responsibility 
of States for International Wrongful Acts, as they leave open the question of whether a 
third State not directly prejudiced by a violation of an obligation that protects a 
collective or general interest may adopt countermeasures against the infringing State
76
. 
Of course, one could argue that Res 1373 establishes obligations that protect 
collective/general interests, but in the context of the institutional architecture organized 
by the SC around Res 1373 it is only this institution that can evaluate failures to comply 
and determine the consequences. Most likely, any unilateral action that sought 
justification based on Res 1373 would damage its implementation system in a way that 
would be almost impossible to repair. In such circumstances, it is to be expected that an 
important number of States would cease to cooperate. 
 
V. Evaluation of the main achievements and shortcomings of SC Resolution 1373 
 
The activation of political, material and technical resources against terrorism articulated 
around Res 1373 has substantially improved States’ capacity to fight this scourge, above 
all raising the ability of those that were previously less sensitive to their responsibility 
in this field. A quick look at the ratification figures of the 16 main international counter-
terrorist conventional instruments reveals the impressive progress achieved in the last 
decade on the normative level
77
. Although the ratification of treaties and the enactment 
of laws are not always followed by their proper implementation, the widespread 
articulation of coherent legislative frameworks (where there were none before) has to be 
qualified as a legal accomplishment and as an unprecedented success in the field of 
international criminal cooperation. 
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However, as has been noted before, the correct and full implementation of these norms 
is much more difficult to achieve
78
. The lack of political will and/or the scarcity of 
material resources lead to poor results in the fight against terrorism on many occasions 
and this should avoid any overoptimistic analysis. From a sectorial perspective, there 
are three fields in which the situation is far from satisfactory: 
 
a) The full implementation of the aut dedere aut judicare principle needs further efforts 
that will take time. Extradition continues to be a complex procedure that requires some 
degree of compatibility between the legal systems of the States concerned
79
 and still in 
that case political or trust considerations can easily interfere with it
80
. Even if the 
principle is enshrined in the national legal system, numerous technical obstacles may 
impede in practice its application
81
. A certain harmonization of criminal laws, in 
particular with regard to terrorist offences, and a worldwide proliferation of extradition 
and judicial cooperation agreements seem necessary before we can envisage significant 
progress on this matter, as many States tend to be less efficient prosecuting terrorist 
offences perpetrated abroad when extradition is not possible. 
 
b) Every State desires to control effectively its frontiers for many reasons (to fight 
smuggling, drugs or arms trade, illegal immigration, endangering endemic species, etc.), 
but no country has ever managed to seal its borders perfectly and many of them simply 
do not have presence in ample parts of their frontier perimeter for lack of resources. In 
this field we can only expect progress to be slow and dependent on the means available. 
 
c) The prevention and prosecution of terrorism financing demands a high degree of 
technical expertise and material resources that are not easily available or that do not fit 
with the uses of the informal economy prevailing in many countries. The CTED, 
together with other international bodies, has organized a great number of workshops 
both at universal and regional levels, and has made an impressive effort of technical 
assistance. Nevertheless, while recognising that relevant progress has been made on this 
subject, the new payment methods, informal transfers, cash payments and the misuse of 
non-profit organizations still provide numerous channels of funding to terrorists who, 




d) As explained before, ‘serious human rights concerns in the counterterrorism context 
persist in all parts of the world’
83
, and despite the integration of human rights and rule 
of law chapters in the evaluation of the technical assistance needs and in the OIAs it is 
clear that many counter-terrorism measures adopted in the wave of the internationally 
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supported effort against terrorism violate human rights. Furthermore, some States have 
taken advantage of the counter-terrorist policies as an excuse to restrict human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that the CTED itself qualifies as jus cogens
84
. The reading of 
the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism of the UN Human Rights 
Council
85
 offers an adequate perspective of the difficult task ahead. 
 
The passing of time has shown the limitations of the SC legislative activity beyond the 
doctrinal debate. Reality has imposed its constraints in the implementation of 
supranational law at the universal level. With the present experience and from a 
transversal perspective, the main obstacles for the incorporation of Res 1373 into 
national law and practice can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) Budgetary constraints vis a vis development or other political priorities. The 
successful implementation of counter-terrorist laws and policies may be very expensive 
and demand considerable human resources. The policing of internet or the tracking of 
financial transactions involves a great deal of work of highly skilled personnel and 
constant and permanent training, while the vigilance of frontiers usually implies the 
acquisition of costly equipment. A State may report having created a legal and 
institutional infrastructure against terrorism that formally meets the requirements of Res 
1373 and yet fail to enforce the law for lack of funds or expert human resources
86
. This 
is the case in many countries, and especially in those with pressing needs derived from 
health or food shortages or suffering an armed conflict. 
 
b) Obstacles to international information sharing. The exchange of information between 
different jurisdictions has proved to be one on the most useful mechanisms to prevent 
(and prosecute) terrorist attacks
87
. Therefore, several instruments that facilitate the 
exchange of data between States have been created, such as the Egmont Group
88
, and 
several institutions have established common databases to facilitate the inter-State 
sharing of information (e.g. Europol or Interpol). However, the need to protect the 
sources of information, or the political mistrust between different governments continue 
to pose a considerable obstacle to the swift exchange of anti-terrorist information, 




c) Traditional obstacles to international cooperation in criminal matters. There are close 
connections between many terrorist groups and transnational organized crime, as the 
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former may obtain financing and material resources (arms, false identity documents, 
etc.) to commit their attacks in a symbiotic relationship
90
. In fact, international 
cooperation against terrorism is just a kind of international criminal cooperation
91
 and 
thus suffers from the same technical and political obstacles (e.g., cumbersome 
extradition procedures, difficulties for international judicial cooperation). In parallel, the 
concealment of terrorism within the much broader flux of international criminal 
relationships further complicates its detection. 
 
d) The lack of a worldwide definition of terrorism. Res 1373 did not made a definition 
of terrorism as this is a contentious issue that divides the international Community and 
any debate on this matter would have aborted the quick adoption of the Resolution
92
. 
This disagreement appears as the main obstacle for the elaboration of a comprehensive 
international convention on international terrorism in the UN
93
. The attempt of the SC 
to fill this gap with its own definition of terrorism in SC Res 1566 (2004)
94
 was ignored 
because it failed to gain international consensus. Thus, the CTC/CTED have worked to 
avoid the problem and basically accepted the national definitions of terrorism, in spite 





e) Lack of political thrust by the SC and the CTC in counter-terrorist cooperation in 
recent years. Although this may be an intended move to de-politicize cooperation 
against terrorism in the UN, it may also show that the main countries in the SC feel that 
political cooperation against terrorism has reached its limit within the UN system. In 
any case, the truth is that the activity of the CTC has become progressively more 
diplomatic, with the CTED developing a technocratic leading role in the SC activities
96
. 
This lowering of political direction may explain the creation in 2011 of the GCTF that 
lacks the legitimacy, diversity and universal projection of the UN, but that allows donor 
countries to address their political priorities in counter-terrorist cooperation flexibly and 
speedily. It cannot be disregarded that initiatives of this kind end up damaging the 
leadership and credibility of the SC counter-terrorist policy even if this is not their 
intention. 
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In view of the precedent analysis, there is a general consensus about the important 
progress achieved by the CTC/CTED enhancing international cooperation and fostering 
the capacity-building of States against terrorism. At the same, it is equally clear that the 
task ahead for the full implementation of Res 1373 is titanic
97
 and that these organs are 
not sufficiently equipped to cope with it. The economic and technical effort needed to 
continue improving these capacities is huge and will have to be sustained in the long 
term. 
 
VI.  Future prospects 
 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has a long history behind it and in all probability 
will continue to strike in the future as long as there are human beings ready to use 
violence in order to achieve their political aims or to seek revenge for real or imaginary 
grievances. International cooperation against terrorism has to be designed in the 
perspective of a permanent effort (and not of exceptionality) that must seek its 
legitimacy in the respect of the rule of law and the universality of its support. In this 
context, the UN has a crucial role to play as it possesses a comparative advantage in 
providing both sources of legitimacy. Furthermore, the SC may give to this international 
cooperation the potential teeth necessary to press those countries that resist abiding by 
minimum standards. 
 
However, the present UN counter-terrorist structure is dysfunctional, as it has been 
constructed in an improvised and scattered way to respond to relatively urgent requests. 
This model has shown its limitations and needs to be redesigned because the UN risks 
progressively losing its leadership and credibility in this matter in favor of donor 
countries’ multilateral or bilateral initiatives. 
 
The CTC/CTED is the main counter-terrorist body of the UN and is now focusing on 
fostering/monitoring law enforcement, a complex task for which it lacks sufficient 
resources. In this context, its prospects of success are slim. This is so, in the first place, 
because law enforcement is just a part of the problem. Terrorism usually has deep social 
roots that connect with problems of injustice or violence that may take generations to 
solve and that need to be addressed to really eliminate the terrorist threat. Thus, 
development and social integration with respect for human rights have to be encouraged 
beyond the security perspective of the CTC/CTED by other institutions
98
. In the second 
place, many of the instruments used against international terrorism are shared with the 
fight against criminal groups and this task is inexhaustible. In the third place, it lacks the 
staff and resources to provide the technical assistance requested by many States and in 
most cases it delegates the job to other regional or specialized organizations (or donor 
countries) that are better prepared for these purposes. While this coordinating role 
should be praised as a way to maximize benefits from an efficient allocation of 
resources, the proliferation of counter-terrorist bodies questions the leading role of the 
CTC/CTED in such scenario. 
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The need for an increased coordination of counter-terrorist bodies is especially pressing 
within the UN system and the creation of a UN counter terrorism coordinator appears as 
a flawed solution
99
: one person cannot solve the overlapping of competencies and, as 
chair of the CTITF, s/he would not be able to control the activities of the SC organs 
(even if s/he has the right to report to the SC). Therefore, I would suggest that the best 
solution for these problems would be the creation of a UN Counter-Terrorist Agency 
that would concentrate all UN efforts against terrorism
100
, bringing together the staff 
and resources of the CTITF and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, the 
Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODOC and even those of the CTED. This Agency 
could develop secure procedures to select its staff and should be able to open permanent 
offices in some States where reinforced assistance and close contact are needed in a 
long term perspective. It may be objected that Res 1373 has to be implemented by a SC 
committee. However, the basic task of the CTED today consists of the coordination and 
provision of technical assistance, which is progressively more intertwined with other 
forms of assistance (development, fight against crime, mediation in conflict resolution) 
that are typically dealt with by other UN Agencies or by programs and subsidiary 
bodies that depend on the GA. The relationship with the SC could be preserved by 
keeping the CTC within its realm and by establishing a system of reporting and 
cooperation similar to the one existing with the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
which has allowed the SC to impose sanctions against those countries not complying 




However, this proposal seems far distant from the present view of the main donor 
countries that have preferred to deviate some their always scarce resources through 
other multilateral (e.g. CGTF) and bilateral initiatives. While the option for less formal 
and more effective instruments of counter-terrorist cooperation is understandable and 
not to be criticized, we should not underestimate the added value that universality 
provides to the fight against terrorism, as many countries will cooperate only in as much 
as the international regime does not seem to be imposed by the most powerful 
countries
102
. International consensus in this common struggle also produces material 
positive results and the UN is the right forum to generate it. 
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